saving private blue

"If the West had succeeded in dominating Ukraine, Russia would have become indefensible. The southern border with Belarus, as well as the southwestern frontier of Russia, would have been wide open. In addition, the distance between Ukraine and western Kazakhstan is only about four hundred miles, and that is the gap through which Russia has been able to project power toward the Caucasus. We should assume, then, that under these circumstances Russia would have lost its ability to control the Caucasus and would have had to retreat farther north from Chechnya.
[…]
After what Russia regarded as an American attempt to further damage it, Moscow reverted to a strategy of reasserting its sphere of influence in the areas of the former Soviet Union. The great retreat of Russian power ended in Ukraine. Russian influence is now increasing in three directions: toward Central Asia, toward the Caucasus, and, inevitably, toward the West, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe. For the next generation, until roughly 2020, Russia’s primary concern will be reconstructing the Russian state and reasserting Russian power in the region.
Interestingly, the geopolitical shift is aligning with an economic shift. Vladimir Putin sees Russia less as an industrial power than as an exporter of raw materials, the most important of which is energy (particularly natural gas). Moving to bring the energy industry under state supervision, if not direct control, he is forcing out foreign interests and reorienting the industry toward exports, particularly to Europe.
[…]
From the Baltics south to the Romanian border there is a region where borders have historically been uncertain and conflict frequent. In the north, there is a long, narrow plain, stretching from the Pyrenees to St. Petersburg. This is where Europe’s greatest wars were fought. This is the path that Napoleon and Hitler took to invade Russia. There are few natural barriers. Therefore, the Russians must push their border west as far as possible to cre­ate a buffer. After World War II, they drove into the center of Germany on this plain. Today, they have retreated to the east. They have to return, and move as far west as possible. That means the Baltic states and Poland are, as before, problems Russia has to solve.
[…]
Defining the limits of Russian influence will be controversial. The United States — and the countries within the old Soviet sphere — will not want Russia to go too far. The last thing the Baltic states want is to fall un­der Russian domination again. Neither do the states south of the northern European plain, in the Carpathians. The former Soviet satellites — particularly Poland, Hungary, and Romania — understand that the return of Rus­sian forces to their frontiers would represent a threat to their security. And since these countries are now part of NATO, their interests necessarily affect the interests of Europe and the United States. The open question is where the line will be drawn in the west. This has been a historical question, and it was a key challenge in Europe over the past hundred years.
[…]
Germany’s position is unpredictable. It is a nation that has learned, given its geopolitical position, that it is enormously dangerous to assert its na­tional interest. […] The German analysis is that engaging in politico-military maneuvers outside of a broad coalition exposes Germany to tremendous danger. At­lantic Europe sees Germany as a buffer against Russia and will see any threat in the Baltics as being irrelevant to their interests. Therefore, they will not join the coalition Germany needs to face the Russians. So the most likely outcome will be German inaction, limited American involvement, and a gradual return of Russian power into the borderland between Europe and Russia.
But there is another scenario. In this scenario Germany will recognize the imminent danger to Poland in Russian domination of the Baltics. See­ing Poland as a necessary part of German national security, it will thus exer­cise a forward policy, designed to protect Poland by protecting the Baltics. Germany will move to dominate the Baltic basin. Since the Russians will not simply abandon the field, the Germans will find themselves in an ex­tended confrontation with the Russians, competing for influence in Poland and in the Carpathian region.
Germany will find itself, of necessity, both split off from its aggressive past and from the rest of Europe. While the rest of Europe will try to avoid involvement, the Germans will be engaged in traditional power politics. As they do that, their effective as well as potential power will soar and their psy­chology will shift. Suddenly, a united Germany will be asserting itself again. What starts defensively will evolve in unexpected ways.
[…]
To understand the nature of the fault line, let me briefly touch on the concept of borderland. Between two neighbouring countries, there is fre­quently an area that has, over time, passed back and forth between them. It is an area of mixed nationalities and cultures."