28 2 / 2011
“But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined,” as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”—
olvastam egy konyvet, amelyik hosszu oldalakon keresztul reszletezte, hogy a kozkeletu elkepzelessel ellentetben valojaban colin powell eroltette, hogy egy jelentosebb szarazfoldi hadereggel foglaljak el irakot, donald rumsfelddel szemben:
Powell conceded that the Iraqi Army had deteriorated substantially since 1991, when over 500,000 coalition troops were needed to take Kuwait alone. However, he still believed that as many as 300,000 troops would be needed to take Iraq now.
[…] If 300,000 troops would be needed, then the United States had to build a coalition. […]
This is exactly what Rumsfeld and the DoD didn’t want. First, if Powell’s plan was to be implemented, the U.S. would have to build up its forces in Kuwait and Turkey in a process that would take at least four months. That meant no invasion would be possible until the fall at the earliest, and that was assuming the deployment would be more rapid than any before. Second, in Rumsfeld’s and the DoD’s opinion, building a coalition would undermine the core psychological effect they thought was necessary — showing that the United States could be effective without the help of others.
Rather than rushing into war, as was claimed later, George W. Bush actually dithered while the press misunderstood the issue. There was no debate over whether or not to go to war. That had been decided months before. There was, however, a debate over what strategy to use.
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